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Evaluation of the CAPAS Program 
by 
Dr. Stephen L. Harris  
and 




I.  Introduction 
 
In December, 1999, the International Development Research Center (IDRC) of 
Canada and Carnegie Corporation of New York contracted Prof. D. Olu Ajakaiye 
and Dr. Stephen L. Harris to conduct an evaluation of the Coordinated African 
Program of Assistance on Services (CAPAS) project jointly funded by them. 
Towards this end the evaluators attended three sub-regional meetings of the held 
in the West, East and Southern African regions. Following each regional meeting 
the Consultants submitted an Interim Report based on:  
 
v A review of most of the country papers prepared for all phases of the 
CAPAS program; 
v a review of the country papers presented at each of these meetings;  
v interviews with many of the individual country participants attending the 
meetings;  
v discussions and interviews with representatives of the multilateral 
institutions, the UNCTAD, and Dr. Thierry Noyelle, the coordinator of the 
analytical program; 
v interviews with representatives of the regional institutions and “think-
tanks”; 
v observations on the efficacy CAPAS process in individual countries; and 
v evaluation of the quality of the policy discussions at the regional 
meetings. 
 
The individuals interviewed in the course of carrying out this evaluation are 
displayed in Appendix I. 
 
One element of the terms of reference (see Appendix II) of the evaluation was an 
assessment of both the feasibility and implications of transferring the 
management of any future phases of a CAPAS-type program to an indigenous 
African institution. The Interim Reports commented on the progress of the 
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evaluators’ thinking on this issue. In addition, the Third Interim Report contained 
an assessment of the proposals by both the African Economic Research 
Consortium (AERC) and the Southern African Trade Research Network 
(SATRN) which became available to the consultants on the occasion of the 
Maseru regional meeting in June 2000. 
 
This Final Report on the CAPAS program is essentially a synthesis of the three 
Interim Reports. Inasmuch as the evaluators’ assessment of the program occurred 
over both time and space it was decided that this document could be more 
effectively prepared on a chronological basis. This allows us to portray the 
cumulative progress or lack thereof in policy capacity and understanding of the 
issues by the participating countries while at the same time weaving in our 
assessment of the inputs to the evaluation enumerated above.  
 
Thus, the report is organized as follows: As background, the next section 
summarizes the history of the project as well as its objectives.  In section III, the 
implementation process of the project is described. The progress in policy-
making capacity that was realized by the participating countries is presented in 
Section IV. This section evolves in a chronological fashion – coincident with the 
three regional meetings. Section V reviews the management of the program. 
Section VI analyzes the prospects of relocating the responsibility for managing 
the program from the UN agencies to an indigenous organization. The views of 
the Consultants regarding the prospective success of relocating the project from 
UNCTAD to an African institution and the implications of this for its objectives 
and implementation strategy are presented. Section VII concludes the Report with 
a summary of findings and recommendations. 
 
II  Background 
 
A. Objectives of the Project 
 
The basic objectives of the CAPAS program were:  
 
v to assist a number of sub-Saharan countries to develop a relevant body of 
knowledge of the service producing industries to inform policy-makers 
about the importance of thee industries to economic development – 
particularly to identify the linkages between services and goods 
producing industries;  
 
v to assist with the understanding of how enhanced activity in international 
services trade (essentially services trade liberalization) could serve 
strengthen the welfare of African societies 
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v to assist officials in the participating governments to develop tools for 
assessing and reforming national policies in services and services trade; 
and 
 
v to assist these countries to develop tactical and strategic positions for the 
next round of GATS negotiations. 
 
These objectives were laudable. In a world where markets, production and 
information have been “globalized” there was an obvious need to ensure that the 
sub-Saharan governments should have an opportunity to participate fruitfully in 
the rapidly changing global economic system. As will be seen, there were many 
obstacles to the successful transition of these less developed countries into the 
modern trading system. Not the least of the obstacles was the political will to 
enhance the quality of life of African citizens. Other obstacles reflect the political 
and business culture of sub-Saharan Africa that cannot easily adopt the model of 
Anglo-Saxon capitalism.  In Africa interests seem to be focussed on the 
particularistic rather than the general. As we will see, this focus on the 
particularistic, more than anything else contributed to the slow progress in 
building the services infrastructures in most countries and has inhibited dynamic 
public policy directed to enhancing the welfare of sub-Saharan Africans. 
 
 
B.  Implementation of CAPAS – An Ideal-type Model 
 
a.  The Stylized Origins of the Project 
 
The CAPAS program was launched in April 1992 as the outcome of a seminar on 
Services in Africa in the Context of Uruguay Round Negotiations.  The seminar, 
held in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, was organized jointly by the Eisenhower 
Center, Columbia University and the UNCTAD.  A total of 10 countries 
participated in the first two phases of the program between 1992 and 1997.1 In 
the third phase, beginning in 1997 another 8 countries participated.2   The plan 
was to compress phases I and II for each of the new participants. In addition, 
special regional studies were to be prepared for the sub-regional seminars on the 




                                                 
1 The countries in Phases I and II were Benin, Burundi, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, 
Uganda and Zimbabwe. 
2 The countries in Phase were III Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cote D’Ivoire, Djibouti, Lesotho, Namibia, 
Swaziland and Zambia. 
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b.  The “Ideal-type” Implementation Modalities  
 
The implementation modalities of CAPAS required specific roles for countries 
and institutions.  Each country was required to establish an Inter-institutional 
Working Group (IWG) -- an advisory group whose members would be drawn 
from the public and private sectors.  The public sector members were to be from 
the relevant government ministries and NGOs while the private sector members 
were to be drawn from industry, consulting firms and other stakeholders. 
Typically the IWG was to be headed by a senior official from the government 
ministry that coordinated the country’s participation in the WTO. This ministry 
would also have been responsible for steering policy proposals from the CAPAS 
research studies through the government machinery implementation processes. 
 
To carry out the studies it was required that a National Research Team (NRT) 
drawn from the universities, research institutes and consulting firms, be 
established.  The NRTs were to prepare analytical studies under the guidance 
and with the support of the IWGs.   
 
In summary, then, the IWGs were to determine the research priorities of the 
NRTs and ideally the findings were to be used by the IWGs to influence the 
preparation of negotiating positions for the GATS.  
 
The IWGs were also to be responsible for organizing national seminars that 
would review the studies and discuss the issues arising therefrom. These 
seminars would also facilitate the dissemination of the research to broader 
domestic audiences. This would serve to establish sensitive policy communities 
and set the stage for policy feedback from the private sectors of the participating 
countries. 
 
c. Coordination of the CAPAS 
 
The CAPAS program would be managed by UNCTAD in Geneva and UN-
DDSMS in New York.  Their roles included overseeing the research program of 
each of the participating countries, planning and organizing the various regional 
meetings, providing methodological support to the NRTs when and where 
necessary. The coordinating institutions disbursed the funds provided by the 
donors for the national studies directly to the leader of the NRTs.  
 
d.  Expected Project Outputs from the “Ideal-type Model” 
 
Given the objectives of the CAPAS program it was reasonable to expect the 
following outputs at the end of the cycle of each country’s participation. Indeed, 
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it is against these outputs that the “value-added” of the CAPAS program can 
determined. The expected outputs were: 
 
v establishment of active IWGs and NRTs in each of the 18 participating 
countries and with the constitution of national seminars in each, the 
beginnings of national policy communities to enhance the policy-decision 
process would evolve; 
 
v preparation of national and/or sectoral studies in each country; 
 
v research outputs that would contribute to the articulation of domestic and 
trade policy reforms aimed at improving the efficiency of services 
producing industries;  
 
v holding of sub-regional policy seminars among the IWGs and NRTs in 
each of West, East, and Southern Africa where national policy 
deliberations and proposed solutions could be compared; 
 
v contribute to the articulation of regional trade positions for certain key 
services industries in the next round of GATS negotiations;  
 
v improve the quality of participation of the countries in the GATS 
negotiations; and, 
 
v nurturing a network of African researchers in the area of trade in services. 
 
 
III.  Evaluation of the Constituent Components of CAPAS 
 
A. Establishment and Functioning of the IWGs and NRTs 
 
The role of the IWGs has been rather problematic – some were very enthusiastic, 
some going along for the ride, and some waiting to be “encouraged” with 
honorariums to participate in the CAPAS process. So while IWGs were 
established in about half of the participating countries, most, with Senegal and 
Kenya being the clear exceptions, were ineffective. The NRTs were more 
responsive to the needs of the project, but here as well, it was the individual 
researchers or one or two key public sector individuals who spearheaded the 
analytical output.3
 
                                                 
3 There were IWGs in Benin, Burundi, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda and 
Zimbabwe and NRTs in most of the participating states. 
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There was a clear need for a more active and robust infrastructure for the CAPAS 
program. It did come to light that some researchers were of the view that the 
compensation for preparation of the papers inadequate. This factor may have 
both limited participation of the analytical community and the endurance of the 
IWGs (when they were in place). Moreover, the lack of enthusiasm of researchers 
probably played a role in hobbling the maturation of the research networks – 
although the lack of communication facilities, and when they were available their 
high costs, also played an important limiting role in achieving the network 
development objectives of the program. 
 
There is a clear impression from all of the sub-regional meetings that more direct 
intervention by the managers of the program (UNCTAD and UN-DDSMS) was  
required if CAPAS was to have an impact on “real policy.” It is judged that there 
were too many “gaps” in the CAPAS process that if filled would have resulted in 
a better outcome. One thinks here of the need for closer supervision of the 
research, direct assistance in both facilitating the establishment and persistence 
of the IWGs, and the dissemination of the CAPAS work among national and sub-
regional regional policy communities. Indeed, the lack of systematic 
dissemination of the research work was an important limitation in the capacity 
building that underpinned the original rationale for the program. The objectives 
of the participants in the sub-regional meetings were not always consistent with 
the objectives of the sponsors. 
 
The evaluators have stressed the need for policy community development from 
the outset. However, it is acknowledge that the idea of a policy-community may 
be inconsistent with the political values of African societies. Nonetheless, there 
must be some mechanism for the private sector to gravitate to common well-
enunciated positions if governments are to act purposively in the area of 
domestic and international services policy. It seemed clear from all of the sub-
regional meetings that there were no incentives for government bureaucrats to 
change their governance stances, which all too often reflect elite rent-seeking 
rather than the welfare of society. 
 
It seems that national workshops at which the reports of the national studies on 
services were discussed were held only in Benin, Kenya and Senegal.  Indeed, 
there were no indications that similar workshops were held in the remaining 7 
participating countries of the CAPAS Phases I and II nor in the 8 participating 
countries of Phase III.  
 
Thus the nurturing of an effective linkage between the studies and policy- 
making, which was an important objective if the CAPAS program was not 
achieved. 
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B. The Research Output 
 




For the most part the Phase I papers were unremarkable for their content. Most 
followed a fixed structure comprising: 
 
v the contribution of services to the respective economies; 
 
v the regulatory environment for service producing industries; 
 
v selected case studies of certain service producing industries; and 
 
v recommendations for future work and policy formation. 
 
In all of the projects there had to be a mapping of the “services” territory before 
serious analysis of the policy actions that should be prescribed for the future 
could begin. The papers in Phase I of the project in the West African countries 
filled such a need. What was remarkable about the papers was the fine job of 
industry mapping that was completed. This was the first attempt for many 
countries to understand their service producing industries – and for those 
involved in the process a good deal was learned. More than that, the authors of 
the individual reports were able to glean sufficient information to end each 
report with a series of recommendations to enhance the service producing 
industries in their countries. 
 
Most of the papers (the Ghana and Senegal probably the best of the Phase I 
documents) contained recommendations: 
 
v that public policy be directed to promoting service infrastructure 
development through the use of tax incentives; 
 
v that public spending in state monopolies should be enhanced – especially 
telephone service; 
 
v that the tourism industry be brought up to international standards with 
implications for virtually all forms of transportation; 
 
v that regional trade agreements to facilitate commerce between countries in 
sub-Saharan  Africa (east, west and south) be negotiated; 
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v that regulations surrounding road transport be streamlined; 
 
v that services regulations be generally friendlier to users of the services. 
 
In addition to specific recommendations of the sort noted above, a number of the 
papers outlined some of the constraints confronting certain industries in their 
attempts to expand the customer base. Some of the examples cited were the state 
monopolies in telecommunications, poor transportation links in the case of 
tourism, and, inefficient regulation in the case of transportation and financial 
services. 
 
Unfortunately, there was little recognition in this first phase of demand and price 
elasticities, so high port and telecommunication tariffs remained in place. 
Generally, public supply of services was seen as inefficient.  The need for 
privatization and the introduction of competition in a number of industries (e.g., 
telecommunications, and air transport were frequently cited) were common 
themes in the papers. 
 
In some instances the constraints in the services producing industries were 
related to the weaknesses in the country’s economy. For example, spare parts for 
the transportation infrastructure (trucks, buses, and aircraft) were frequently 
hard to come by -- which had the effect of undermining services delivery. 
Outdated computer technology was often handed down from the developed 
countries putting the countries at a competitive disadvantage when it came to 
enhancing service delivery in tourism and transportation. 
 
The linkages between services generally and economic development were noted 
in most documents, but it is not obvious that the data available to countries was 
sufficiently robust to make anything but “motherhood” statements about these 
connections. Nonetheless, stated intentions were in the right direction. Some 
concrete examples of poor transportation infrastructure inhibiting the export of 
agriculture products were noted.  
 
On balance, without exception the Phase I papers were good “first cracks” at a 
formidable task. However one does come away from them with the impression 
that the problems in the services producing industries (and perhaps more 
generally) are not so much problems of international trade as they are ones of 
governance. While this impression was apparent at the outset of the project, it is 
not obvious that the governance deficit has yet been addressed. While there will 
be more to say on this below it is obvious that there is no development strategy 
in most of the African countries. We speak of a development strategy of say what 
has transpired in North and South East Asia. While there were and still are 
governance problems in these latter countries, it is the case that governments 
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were interested in building wealth and opportunity in their societies – despite 
their mercantilist tendencies. One does not get the impression that political and 
bureaucratic elites in these Phase I African countries were of the same mind. 
Indeed, the opposite seems to be true.4 
 
Phase II – The Communications Industry Paper 
 
Phase II of the CAPAS project had as its objective the preparation of national 
sectoral studies in a number of industries – financial services, trade-
infrastructure services, telecommunications, trade in skilled labor, and optimal 
regulation. We have only looked at the telecommunications paper prepared 
under the auspices of the ITU. 
 
The telecommunications paper certainly made the point (the “ideal case”) about 
the importance of telecommunications facilitating national economic 
development. The paper identified the constraints to broadening the 
infrastructure – finance, human resources, technology and entrepreneurship.  
 
The paper points to the need for the CAPAS countries to enter into commitments 
under the GATS to ensure that some competition in this industry occurs. This is 
clearly appropriate although the benefit that would accrue to civil societies is still 
problematic -- given the costs of building the infrastructure and the associated 
high tariffs that will confront users. Thus, while the countries can liberalize entry 
and ownership in this industry, there is the constraint of user affordability that 
showed no signs of amelioration -- judging from the contents of the ITU paper. 
Discussions with the Ghanaian representatives in Abidjan, for example, 
suggested that very little progress has been made in expanding the 
telecommunications network in that country; and, moreover, consumer costs 




The Phase III documentation that was available to the evaluators represented a 
compression of Phases I and II for a new set of countries. There is little to add in 
a qualitative sense about these documents that has not already been suggested in 
the preceding review. For all of the participating countries in this new Phase 
there was a requirement to map out the territory and this was done. Little new 
was forthcoming – although it was surprising how limited was the progress in 
this new set of countries, some six years after the start of the CAPAS program. 
Generally, one gets the impression that the participating countries have been 
unable to come to grips with the internationalization of world commerce 
                                                 
4 The Benin paper put it succinctly. There is a need for  “Une reconversion totale des mentalite s’impose 
tant au niveau des agents de l”etat.” Everyone else, the paper states, understands this. 
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generally, and certainly have not thought deeply about policy surrounding trade 
in services. 
 
As was the case for the Phase I and II participants, the basic service 
infrastructures were very undeveloped. While this was recognized, there was 
little in the documents about how to deal with this problem. While key service 
sectors were examined and the obvious conclusions reached with respect to the 
weaknesses and obstacles to progress, it was not obvious that a coherent 
understanding of the linkages and a rational plan to take account of the linkages 
in fostering economic development could be forthcoming. The individual sector 
studies seemed to be disembodied from the one another. However, this is not to 
detract from the usefulness of mapping out the territory – which was the prime 
objective. 
 
In this Phase there was specific comment in a number of papers about the GATS 
with the generic acknowledgement of the social benefits of lower barriers to 
trade. Unfortunately, however, the policy advice does not go much further than 
this.  
 
b. Research Studies in the Countries of East Africa 
 
Generally the research papers prepared by the East African countries provided 
an overview of the services. However, policy-analysis, policy prescription and 
evaluation were minimal.  
 
In the case of the Kenyan papers, which were the most robust of this group of 
countries, a more sophisticated level of analytics had been anticipated by the 
evaluators. For example, in the introduction of a professional services overview 
paper, the Kenyans observe that “A key input into the efficient supply of 
[services] is a free movement of professionals across borders, which enable areas 
with a deficiency in the pool of professional resources to benefit from those with 
surpluses.”5 While in the normal course of development this would be true, the 
Kenyans seem to have a perpetual surplus of professionals, but little progress 
had been made on absorbing them into the domestic economy where some 
observers say there are shortages of these skills. Without a more detailed 
assessment of the situation in Kenya it is obviously difficult to make an 
unequivocal evaluation of this situation, but exporting domestic problems is 
probably not the way to deal with them. There are weaknesses in post-secondary 
education policy and/or in resource allocation -- which the government has 
either caused and is unwilling to deal with or there is some market failure which 
the government does not want to address. For example, 
                                                 
5 G. Ikiara, M. Murira, W. Nyangena, “Professional Services; Kenya,” Paper prepared for the Sub-
Regional CAPAS Meeting in Nairobi, March 2-3, 2000, 3. 
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A number of factors constrain the development of medical 
services in Kenya. The first, and perhaps most serious of the 
supply side constraints, is lack of adequate facilities (hospitals 
and equipment) and poor maintenance of facilities that exist. 
The effects of poor working conditions have been aggravated 
by poor remuneration, another supply constraint. Poor pay 
has forced doctors to resort either to private clinics or seek 
employment in other countries. The doctors that remain in 
public service suffer from low morale and lack of incentives 
for professional development. Medical professionals suggest 
that improved and easier availability of loans could go a long 
way in assisting them to establish hospitals and other 
facilities.6
 
The same holds for engineering and architectural services7 while there is a 
shortage of lawyers.8 It seems necessary to deal with the domestic imbalances 
domestically rather than trying to export these valuable resources during a 
period when this country needs all the human capital it can muster to facilitate 
domestic economic and political advancement. 
 
In the case of services liberalization the situation is not any better. In Kenya, 
despite liberalization of ports, air transport, tourism and telecommunications, 
little advancement has been evident.9  Lawlessness around the port of Mombassa 
and unproductive port workers, expensive air transport which diminishes 
demand, low telecommunication density (1% percent of the population have 
access) all work to reduce the prospects for economic advancement. The Kenyans 
did attempt to shift blame for some of their problems to the multi-lateral 
organizations and to donor countries: 
 
Not only have Kenya and other African countries failed to 
take advantage of the technical assistance and special and 
differential (S & D) rights, but the developed countries have 
been only too eager to attack these S & D provisions. In 
addition, the assistance program and the special and 
differential provisions have been sometimes incorrectly 
conceived. There have been complaints that the WTOs agenda 
for least developed countries suggests an incorrect diagnosis 
of the technical problems facing LDCs by the organization. 
                                                 
6 Ibid., 13 
7 Ibid., 17 
8 Ibid., 21 
9 See G. Ikiara, M. Murira, W. Nyangena, “State of Play of Service Liberalization: Kenya,” Paper prepared 
for the Sub-Regional CAPAS Meeting in Nairobi, March 2-3, 2000. 
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For instance, WTO has identified the absence of technical 
capacity as the main problem, in complete disregard of the 
role of the unsuitability of some of its rules. Rather than 
helping [the] least developed countries to enhance their 
capacity to exploit the special and differential provisions and 
rights, the technical assistance program only helps those 
countries to meet their obligations under WTO agreements 
and to meet the standards for investment, production and 
commerce required in the international trade regime. The 
integrated initiative, furthermore, introduces political 
divisions between African LDCs and non-LDCs as the 
technical assistance program is meant for the former group of 
countries only. 
 
There are a couple of observations that can be made about this Kenyan assertion: 
 
v First, a point made several times, the Kenyan’s domestic and trade policy 
capacity is inadequate for the complicated world that they face. CAPAS 
should have focussed on policy-making capacity and policy evaluation. 
Indeed, it could still be argued that the sub-Saharan countries do not 
understand the nature and character of WTO commitments – which is 
what CAPAS was all about. 
 
v On the other hand, there is probably some truth to what the Kenyans 
assert. Trade negotiations are clearly a rent-seeking exercise. Neo-
liberalism – as a form of economic democracy – is inconsistent with the 
authoritarian political regimes that are now present in most African 
countries (even those who profess to have democratically elected 
governments). 
 
The Ugandan and Tanzanian papers on air transport, and tourism and road 
transport were purely descriptive. In the case of Tanzania there is an apparent 
lack of both political will and a stable economic structure to facilitate the growth 
of a viable tourism industry. An unfriendly bureaucracy compounds this. Similar 
bureaucratic inefficiencies have humbled the road transportation industry – a 
situation compounded by poor infrastructure. It can be argued that until the 
domestic authorities are prepared to deal with their indigenous problems there is 
little that services trade will do to improve the situation. These problems draw 
into question the policy priorities of the government. It seems clear that there is 





c. Research Studies in the Countries of Southern Africa 
 
As was the case for the countries of West and East Africa the nine CAPAS papers 
presented by the Southern African countries were of varying quality and 
analytical substance. Most of the papers had been prepared at least two years ago 
and had not been updated from 1998. So it was difficult to know what if any 
progress had been made in the intervening period. The papers essentially 
mapped out the policy fields to which they were directed: Health Services 
(Zambia), Financial Services and Telecommunications (Namibia),  Movement of 
Labor (South Africa), and, Water and Electricity (Lesotho). Both Namibia and 
South Africa also presented more general papers on services liberalization in 
their respective countries. 
 
The designated researchers prepared all of the papers. In the case of the Namibia 
papers, they were very comprehensive and there was some real understanding 
by the authors of the policy field and of the need for nurturing robust services 
producing industries. Nonetheless, the impact of the CAPAS research on public 
policy decision-making had been minimal. The main reason for this unfortunate 
situation was that the CAPAS “model” could just not get up any momentum in 
the country. There were a number of factors contributing to this: first, the former 
head of the Policy Research Unit was at odds with the government and he 
continually tried to upstage the government on many substantive policy fronts. 
In addition the research budget was inadequate and the IWG “never really got 
off the ground.” As a consequence there was little connection between the 
government, the private sector and the NGOs in developing GATS negotiating 
positions – i.e., the latent policy community remained dormant. 
  
The Zambia papers were rather confusing. The health sector is in a shambles and 
until the government gets its health policy sorted out there seemed little place for 
a paper on trade in health services. As was the case in many East and West 
African countries there is a “brain drain” of medical services practitioners from 
Zambia and the government should develop polices to keep these professionals 
at home. There was a plea, in the more general Zambian paper on services 
liberalization, for “Zambia to relate its efforts [to] the regional framework and 
cooperate within the SADC and the COMESA.”  This plea is sensible at the 
theoretical level. However, it is clear that many countries attending the Maseru 
meetings, Zambia included, do not yet have the national policy capacity to 
govern their own domestic affairs in services in a proper fashion – to say nothing 
of their capacity in the regional or global sphere. In addition, there is a lack of 
capacity for and understanding of the requirements and consequences of the 
integration implied in the SADC. The CAPAS model in Zambia gave rise to 
much the same problems experienced in Namibia. 
 
 15
South Africa is obviously the most advanced country in southern Africa, but the 
tone of their papers and the character of the interventions in the meeting brought 
into question the commitment of that country to more open trade with its 
neighbors. The papers presented at this meeting were rather legalistic (on the 
movement of persons) and very weak on the analytical front. The CAPAS 
research was ancillary to the actual policy making process and was thus not very 
influential. Indeed, bilateral discussions did not provide a clear picture of what 
role CAPAS did play in official circles. 
 
 
C. The Regional Workshops 
 
Regional meetings were organized in West Africa (Abidjan), East Africa 
(Nairobi) and Southern Africa (Maseru) by UNCTAD. Observations from each of 
these meetings are as follows. 
 
a. West African Meeting in Abidjan, December, 1999 
 
Beginning with the understanding of the objectives of the project, it appears that 
most participants at the Abidjan meeting were fully aware of the basic objectives 
of CAPAS (outlined above). They agreed that the objectives were very pertinent 
to the economic development of their countries and necessary in order to assure 
their effective participation in the GATS negotiations. 
 
Specifically, there was general agreement among the participants at Abidjan that: 
 
v CAPAS Phase I was designed to help countries map out the services 
producing industries in their respective countries. Participants were of 
the view that the objectives of Phase I, namely stock-taking, assessment 
of resources, bottlenecks, needs, current achievements and potential of 
the services sector of each country had been reasonably achieved. 
 
Specifically, each country has been able to prepare a respectable National Study 
Report on Services. These Reports were largely descriptive. As a result members of 
the NRTs and the IWGs, where they existed, now “fully” appreciate the 
importance of services for the economic development of their respective 
countries. 
 
v It was also generally agreed that CAPAS Phase II was aimed at 
enhancing the policy-making capacity of participating countries with a 
view to promoting effective participation in the GATS. 
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Specifically, participants believe that the detailed industry studies carried out in 
Phase II of CAPAS have undoubtedly deepened the understanding of each 
industry for the individual participants. In the case of countries participating in 
Phase III, the same degree of knowledge and understanding has probably been 
achieved. 
 
Thus, the objective of capacity building has been achieved, although it is obvious 
that policy capacity beyond the level of individual participants (with very few 
exceptions) has not been achieved.  
 
v It was also generally agreed that the strategy of developing a policy 
network from the CAPAS program, especially at the national level, 
was a laudable objective. 
 
In particular, the idea of setting up an IWG to guide each NRT was very 
innovative. However, as noted above, the role of the IWGs has been rather 
problematic in most countries.  
 
Indeed, it was not obvious to us that African policy-makers are focusing on 
implementing policies that are in the best interests of their countries generally. 
There seems to be a paucity of interest in pursuing good policy – policies that 
will have the effect of improving the welfare of civil societies. Discussions with 
country representative suggest that this kind of policy culture is a major obstacle. 
In this regard it was useful to think of complementing the “bottom-up” approach 
adopted by CAPAS Coordinators with a ‘top-down” strategy for policy 
development in the area of services. Moreover, it is clear that at the pinnacle of 
policy development there was little understanding of the importance of services 
per se, nor of the importance of the “linkage-effect” of services in enhancing 
goods production. 
 
b. East African Meeting in Nairobi, March 2000 
 
There were various degrees of understanding of the objectives of CAPAS among 
the people interviewed. The position of the Kenyans was clearly more advanced 
than that of Uganda and Tanzania, for example. 
 
All countries indicated clearly that prior to their involvement in CAPAS the 
understanding of service producing industries and their contribution to 
economic activity and growth was minimal. From that perspective, the 
contribution of the program has been very useful. Having said that, however, the 
knowledge has been accumulated well down in the policy-making hierarchy, 
and generally policy outputs in the area of services do not mirror the professed 
accumulation of knowledge about the services industry. 
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The Kenyan representative tried to underscore the enhanced capacity of policy-
making in services by pointing to the opening speech of the Minister of Tourism 
and Trade at the conference. The speech was good indeed; it recognized the trade 
policy issues and the hope that the conference would enhance countries’ 
understanding of what had to be done. However, on delegate suggested that the 
speech had been “cribbed” from an article in the Financial Times. That latter 
observation would be consistent with the lack of progress in building services 
infrastructure services on the ground. 
 
In the case of Uganda there was a clear case of the lack of understanding of what 
had to be done to build capacity in the service producing industries. Indeed, the 
Ugandans suggested that they were not sure they were part of the CAPAS 
program and moreover did not know what they were supposed to do to carry 
out credible participation. Because the CAPAS structure was not robust in the 
country there was a plea for assistance on how to move ahead. 
 
The situation in Tanzania was only slightly better than that in Uganda. The 
mapping of the services industries has moved ahead. However, there have been 
many problems in hiring the appropriate researchers and the research papers 
had not yet reached the final draft stage. So while some knowledge has been 
accumulated there was also a clear call for help in determining which services 
areas to develop and how to formulate appropriate trade polices in the areas 
chosen for study. 
 
In both Uganda and Tanzania there has been little involvement of the private 
sector and there was no presence of an IWG. Thus one can presume that while 
some knowledge of the services producing industries has been accumulated at 
the junior levels, the senior policy-making cadre remains very disadvantaged. 
 
The situation in Kenya is very different at the CAPAS process stage – although 
perhaps not at the policy output stage – compared to Uganda and Tanzania. The 
Kenyans established the IWGs right at the beginning and so there was a close 
following of the project from the beginning. The IWG comprised practitioners, 
researchers and policy-makers. The IWG carefully reviewed the research papers 
before they were finalized and a number of seminars were held with the private 
sector and the information was widely disseminated after the seminars. There 
was a distinct attempt to build a policy community in Kenya. 
 
The Kenyans used the material produced for CAPAS to help inform trade 
diplomats about developments in their country as well as in others. Moreover, 
the CAPAS program has stimulated student research in the universities. Looking 
ahead, the Kenyans planned to work towards enhancing contact between the 
private sector, government and the researchers. 
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In the case of all of the country representatives interviewed there was an 
unmistakable wish for a continuation of the CAPAS program. The sub-regional 
meetings were seen as a very useful forum for the exchange of ideas.  
 
It is not yet obvious that the participating countries have graduated from the 
CAPAS program. The knowledge base about the services producing industries 
clearly has been enhanced. However, it is difficult to observe any credible 
services trade policy-making capacity. As noted earlier, the Kenyans seem to 
have confused domestic and trade policy. So there is a clear requirement to 
enhance policy analysis and policy-making capacity. The participating countries 
still require varying degree of hand holding to achieve the ultimate objectives of 
CAPAS.  
 
The situation regarding policy-making capacity can be summarized as follows: 
 
v There is a services industries knowledge base to build upon in most East 
African countries, but there is an obvious need to continue the process. 
Understanding of the linkages between services and the rest of the 
economic production chain must be enhanced. For example, if e-
commerce is to take hold, countries must understand the need to build a 
robust communications infrastructure in their countries and educate the 
population about the technology. Perhaps starting in the schools is the 
way to go. 
 
v There is a need to enhance the policy-making capacity in the participating 
countries. The fact that the services producing industries have been 
mapped-out does not by itself serve to enhance policy-making capacity. 
 
v There is a need to help countries understand the linkages between policies 
(e.g., road infrastructure and port enhancement). 
 
v The lack of political will or lack of policy-making understanding probably 
requires some work at the top of the policy-making hierarchy rather than 
just focussing on the bottom of the hierarchy. 
 
Discussions with the WTO representative about the Organization’s appreciation 
of the impact of the CAPAS program suggests that: 
 
v On balance there has been some disappointment with the impact of 
CAPAS as measured by the participation of the African countries at the 
WTO. They (the African Countries) are rarely “in the room” during 
negotiations and discussions and when they are their participation is 
minimal.  When they do participate, the interventions are brief and 
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generally are to agree with a position that has already been enunciated. 
 
v On the other hand, the documentation that has resulted from the CAPAS 
program, for some countries, has been very helpful to the WTO 
Secretariat. 
 
c. Southern African Meeting, Maseru, June 2000 
 
In addition to the CAPAS papers presented at this meeting, and commented 
upon above, a number of SADC commissioned papers were also discussed at the 
meeting. The best was probably presented by the Mauritius representative on the 
need for a common tourism policy in the Southern Africa Community. This was 
probably the most sensible proposal of the three days, but it fell on deaf ears. 
Had the SADC countries agreed to work on one sector – tourism for example -- 
where there could be a “big bang” for the effort in terms of long term fixed 
investment in infrastructure and employment creation, it would have proved to 
the community that there was something that they could agree upon and 
perhaps develop successfully. 
 
The contribution by UNTAD at this meeting was generally characteristic of its 
overall offering to the project – not very helpful. The size of its delegation was 
overwhelming and inversely related to the quality of the presentations. One 
delegate characterized the UNCTAD as preaching like an “old professor while 
the students slept.” It was the case that the UNCTAD representatives were either 
inexperienced – in which case the presentation was incomprehensible -- or so 
experienced such that the actual needs of meeting participants were only 
incidental to the desire of the presenter show how smart he/she was.  In reality, 
the UNCTAD did not understand its audience. The organization was an 
advocate for the WTO and its processes, with little though directed at the real 
needs of the participating countries. Also, the UNCTAD officials seemed to have 
some problems separating their own bureau interests form those of the Africans.  
 
If UNCTAD has a comparative advantage it is probably in the more technical 
area of helping the developing countries to understand the GATS and WTO 
processes and they should restrict their efforts to that area. I have seen no net 
contribution in the area of trade analytics or in trade policy development. 
Generally, they were a distraction to the focus and objective of the CAPAS 
program. 
 
UNCTAD proposed that it and SADC should jointly seek funding for the SADC 
component of CAPAS IV “so as to provide support to SADC countries in the sub-
regional and GATS negotiations.” There was a suggestion by the UNCTAD 
representatives that the Commonwealth Secretariat would be providing some 
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financial support to a future program. However, the representative from the 
Secretariat, upon hearing of the existence of the AERC and SATRN proposals 
(revealed by the World Bank), appeared to withdraw the offer of support 
pending an evaluation of the proposals.   
 
The character of support that was suggested should emanate from a CAPAS IV 
type program was contained in the “official” draft record of the meeting. The key 
points are noted below: 
 
i. Overarching Support 
 
v to enhance negotiating capacity; 
 
v to develop analytical information and enhance data collection to facilitate 
better, more dynamic, and more effective participation of SADC 
negotiators at international negotiations on trade in services; 
 
v to prepare  assessments of services sectors for each country as a 
prerequisite to liberalization; and 
 
v to improve the understanding of the role that services can play in the 
developmental process of SADC countries both at the national and 
regional levels. 
 
While these objectives are quite agreeable, it is not clear that UNCTAD has, from 
past performance, displayed the analytical capacity to manage such an 
overarching policy analysis program.  Indeed, some of these objectives are the 
same as those of the program being evaluated here.  
 
ii.  Technical and Negotiating Support 
 
v analytical work to support the formulation of negotiating positions at 
SADC and WTO/GATS levels; 
 
v training and support for services trade negotiators; 
 
v preparation of an inventory of measures affecting services in the SADC 
countries at the regional level; 
 
v preparation of  strategic guidelines to ensure coherence and 
convergence for SADC countries during negotiations in the framework 
of GATS as well as in the context of other regional or international 
arrangement; and, 
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v to preparing SADC members for negotiations both in framework and 
sector issues.  
 
Evidence suggests that it is in the technical and negotiating areas that UNCTAD 
could help the African countries (not only the SADC countries). However, in 
addition to the list of technical support requirements, the issue of governance, 
which was obviously missing in the UNCTAD inspired agenda, should not be 
left out. The CAPAS model of public, private and NGO consultations is 
absolutely necessary. Indeed, the absence of a policy community to bring 
pressure on states for change is conspicuous by its absence, in sub-regional 
discussions as well as in the research papers. It is obvious that governments will 
not listen to academics and private researchers. Other components of civil society 
must be empowered if these less developed countries are to achieve their 
economic and social development goals. It seems clear that without a clear 
mission for the governance regimes of each state no amount of academic or 




IV.      Capacity Building and CAPAS 
 
The evaluators were told that capacity building was indirect and at lower levels 
of the official bureaucracy. Nonetheless, it is clear that the researchers wanted 
some form of CAPAS to continue. However, the objectives would have to be 
narrower – directing research at “winning industries” with more direct 
assistance to the various research institutes and networks involved in the 
program.  
 
Generally, it is always difficult to know if the researchers truly believe “some” 
policy progress can be made in the country through direct influence on official 
decision-makers or whether they just need funding to keep their institutes viable. 
There is probably a need for some conditionality in any future funding of trade 
in services research to ensure that the public, private and NGO sector triangle 
does mature in a fashion that will serve the public interest. 
 
The assessment of capacity building is somewhat easier to deal with than is the 
assessment of the research papers.  
 
The first observation to make is that the groups that met at the three sub-regional 
meetings generally were rather impressive. These people were clearly experts in 
their fields having accumulated a good deal of knowledge under the auspices of 
the CAPAS program.  Most agreed that CAPAS had been positive for them 
personally. The success of the IWGs was spotty at best with most participants 
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making criticism of either or both of private and public sector participants in the 
IWGs. This in part explains why the stock of policy-making expertise has not 
accumulated further up the decision-making ladder. 
 
From discussions it was clear that not all countries understood what was 
required of them. The managers of the program suggested that CAPAS was 
designed to plant a seed for these developing countries, but that the countries 
themselves would have to make the seed grow. In retrospect it is obvious that 
more “hand-holding” was necessary. Hand-holding not only in directing and 
producing the reports, but also in helping to penetrate the real decision-making 
cadre in each state.  
 
In this regard, the participation of fewer countries, but with greater resources 
directed at each participant perhaps would have been preferable. Perhaps a 
multi-country meeting – at either the Ministerial or Permanent Secretary level –
would have been one way to harvest the capacity that had been nurtured at the 
working level. Also, funding directed at facilitating exchange programs between 
researchers and the public sector could have been another way to facilitate the 
building of policy/analytic capacity. As it stands now there is a wide gap 
between the research output and the policy-making elites. 
 
Capacity building was also to be facilitated by the public dissemination of the 
results of the research that had been undertaken. Thus, exporters, policy-makers, 
industry participants were to come together to consider the reports. For the most 
part this did not happen, or if it did occur the ability to impact public policy was 
meager at best. So governments are still not sufficiently aware of the importance 
of advancing the service- producing infrastructure to facilitate the economic 
development of their countries. One delegation suggested that their authorities 
were not interested in improving social welfare if it risked weakening their own 
power over civil society. 
 
It was also envisaged that the participants in the CAPAS program would 
themselves form a research network to exchange papers and share experiences. 
Plainly, it did not happen in any of the sub-regions. It is not clear why this was 
the case, but it is apparent that some sort of support secretariat is necessary if a 
sub-regional or pan- African network is to build on what already has been 
sponsored by CAPAS and flourish. This is perhaps something that UNCTAD 
should have undertaken but did not. It was clearly beyond the capacity and 
mandate of Noyelle. However, since it was evident early on that this important 




The inability of the network to support itself does call into question whether the 
countries can themselves manage the program in the future. There seems to be 
an element of inertia amongst most of those interviewed. The occasion when the 
network inertia was overcome was when a CAPAS sponsored conference took 
place. It seemed clear that the participants found considerable benefit from 
exchanging information.  
 
So it is judged that the objective of capacity building of the program has not been 
met completely. Unfortunately, this bottom-up approach of capacity building 
imbedded in the CAPAS program has not penetrated the senior levels of the 
bureaucracy nor the political elites and thus with few exceptions the CAPAS 
program has not directly influenced public policy-making. Most of those 
interviewed suggested that capacity-building must occur at the more senior 
levels.  
 
A representative of the SADC Secretariat was critical of the UNCTADs 
presentations and interventions which were designed to coerce the participating 
SADC countries onto the WTO timetable without taking adequate account of the 
lack of indigenous domestic and trade policy capacity in virtually all countries. 
Thus the SADC representatives was critical of the sentiment expressed in the 
meeting’s draft press release which “underscored the need to ensure coherence 
and convergence in the trade policy dimension of the various sectors of services 
in context of the regional framework in order to facilitate the process of 
integration.” This sentiment was echoed by country representatives stationed in 
Geneva. 
 
V. Management of CAPAS 
 
Given the allocation of financial resources available to the project perhaps one 
could not have expected a more robust management of it. That being said, it is 
our view that the lack of a transparent management structure has taken its toll on 
the researchers and on the impact of the program in realizing its ultimate 
objective of influencing public policy decision-making. 
 
First, we judge that the resources for the project were spread too thinly over the 
many countries participating in the program. It would have been preferable to 
work more intensively with those countries where it was presumed measurable 
progress could be made in building a service infrastructure and thus could 
benefit from robust participation in the GATS. As the project evolved it is clear to 
us that a bottleneck developed after the research papers had been prepared. At 
that moment there was an obvious need to help these researchers create domestic 
networks to influence policy. While the IWG mechanism was designed to 
facilitate this, for one reason or another it did not work. 
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Second, it is not clear what role UNCTAD played in this process. The officials 
contacted seemed aware of the problems but did little to try and rectify the 
policy dissemination process. UNCTAD was of the view that “this process 
should have been more structured in each of the participating countries.” 
Moreover, officials at UNCTAD could only talk about CAPAS at a very high 
level. They were unable to provide an assessment of the degree of capacity 
building that had taken place over the eight years of the program nor could they 
portray the character of expectations for the countries participating in the 
“current” round of WTO negotiations. Indeed, UNCTAD officials wondered out 
loud how to define capacity! 
 
UNCTAD officials suggested that they should have been involved in setting out 
the terms of reference for this evaluation and on balance were rather defensive 
when it came to reviewing the issues of where to go with CAPAS in the future. 
They stressed the importance of networks, the need to enhance the dependence 
of governments on the networks – but felt that decentralization of CAPAS 
funding would be rather “sad” because the researchers could not manage the 
networks and the research program themselves. UNCTAD, it was suggested had 
many in-house experts who were helping the CAPAS countries although specific 
examples were missing. There was also the suggestion that the African countries 
would not alone meet among themselves to exchange information. In retrospect 
UNCTAD did little to shore up the weaknesses that have already been identified. 
 
We found little in the way of accolades from participating countries about the 
performance of UNCTAD. One researcher suggested “UNCTAD was a mess” – 
and compared unfavorably to CIDA with whom he had worked some years 
earlier. The evaluators tend to agree with the assessment that UNCTADs role has 
not been as fruitful as one could have expected.  
 
Third, the role of Thierry Noyelle has been significant in maintaining CAPAS 
momentum. However, his expectations of what the participating countries could 
do on their own was unfortunately over-estimated. As noted earlier, it was his 
expectation that all these countries needed was a little push-start and they would 
carry-the-ball themselves. Had the process been nurtured more vigorously 
perhaps the out-turn would have been more positive from the perspective of 
influencing public policy. 
 
One could also reasonably question whether focussing on trade in services rather 
than simply on building services infrastructure where it was weak would have 
been more fruitful. Bilateral arrangements between African and developed 
countries may have been more beneficial than concentrating on pure trade issues. 
Given the weakness in governance structures in these countries, generalized 
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liberalization seems to connote political problems to political elites. As things 
stand now there seems to have been little progress, for example, in building a 
good telecoms infrastructure in most countries, the tourism industry is generally 
moribund, transportation is hindered by regulatory obstacles and self-serving 
monopolies. 
 
In reality the missing element in this whole process has been a desire by 
governors to really want to help the governed. Democratic values associated 
with transparency, ethics, social welfare, self-sufficiency or independence and 
especially the rule of law have not sufficiently penetrated these societies. Self-
interest seeking or rent-seeking behavior seems to prevail among governors 
while civil societies struggles to exist on a day-today basis. There is little that 
these governors can give up at WTO negotiations – it is a one way street – which 
will not impinge on the power and perks of holding public office. So there is a 
need first to change the political environment and political culture, establish 
development plans that will benefit civil society and then proceed to the world 
stage. As it stands now the sequencing seems to be wrong so it is not surprising 
that the CAPAS has had only limited success.  
 
 
VI.        Relocating CAPAS in an African Institution(s) 
 
With regard to the prospects of relocating CAPAS in an African Institution, 
discussions were held with officials of the World Bank, African Economic 
Research Consortium, and the Southern African Trade Research Network 
present at the regional meetings.  Discussions were also held with staff of 
UNCTAD and UN-DDSMS on this issue.  However, it was at the Maseru 
meeting that concrete proposals were presented by AERC and SATRN. The 
evaluators’ observations on these proposals are as follows. 
 
a. The AERC Proposal 
 
The AERC proposal seems to go well beyond the rather narrow focus of services 
trade that was the focus of CAPAS. While this is certainly a desirable feature of 
the “ideal-type” scenario, some of the participants in the CAPAS program 
suggested the need for a more narrow focus. More importantly, however, the 
AERC does not recognize head-on what the CAPAS model had intended to 
accomplish but did not: in the areas of the policy community development, in the 
research results, and in CAPASs impact on policy elites. Without a clear 
understanding of what went wrong, embarking on a program with a similar 
“modus operandi” but of wider scope make the achievement of valuable 
outcomes rather problematic. 
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The absence of purposeful governance regimes in most of the sub-Saharan 
African countries has been a major contributor to what is characterized by AERC 
as “African marginalization.” The AERC proposal asserts that “policies that 
foster a harmonious and orderly integration of African countries into the world 
economy can be viewed as vehicles for promoting their rapid and sustainable 
development.” It goes on to suggest “if African countries wish to derive full 
benefits from their integration into the global economy, they must seek more 
effective representation and more actively participate in the processes involved 
in the evolution and management of the governance arrangements for the global 
economy.”  
 
It is unclear how the African nations can participate more legitimately in the 
management of international governance arrangements in the absence of robust 
internal domestic governance regimes. It is important to deal directly with issues 
surrounding democratic deficits in most of these countries.  The CAPAS model 
was designed to include the public, private and para-public sectors in the policy-
making and decision processes -- but this important goal was not realized. This 
was an important deficiency of the CAPAS program outturn and unless rectified 
will continue leave the private sector out of the policy process generally and 
trade policy processes in particular. What this means is that trade policy is left to 
senior bureaucrats who have next to no “on the ground” experience in how 
international (and domestic) markets work and how they can help economic and 
social development.  The AERC proposal will entrench this disappointing 
situation.  
 
The evaluators are also puzzled by the notion that the African countries will be 
able to effectively integrate themselves into a regional trading bloc, however 
widely or narrowly defined. It is our assessment that such a regime, advocated 
by academics and bureaucrats, is based on hope rather than on rational or 
purposeful design. This rather “fuzzy” thinking and the resulting weakness of 
the proposal rests on the absence of sound internal governance regimes. If 
national institutions are weak how will strong regional institutions emerge? 
There appears to be a systemic problem in African governance and discussion of 
this issue is absent in the AERC proposal. 
 
The AERC does recognize the capacity problems in individual African countries, 
but the issue dribbles off the table as the authors look ahead. One is really left 
wondering for whom policies are being designed. Also, there is no discussion of 
private sector capacity nor of para-public sector capacity. 
 
Thus the AERC proposal ought to be embellished so that it deals with the 
capacity problem where the capacity problem exists. There is a need to focus on: 
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v Capacity Building for democratic governance including notions of: 
 
v The public interest; 
 
v Development and nurturing of the private and para-public 
sectors;  
 
v Nurturing the development of policy communities so that there is a clear 
understanding for whom trade policies are supplied and the benefits that 
will accrue; 
 
v Joint action by African states should be directed at seeking across-the-
board access to the markets of advanced nations in key primary product-
markets (agriculture). Regional joint action should be limited to industries 
that can become “regional” champions. Policies of convergence in the area 
of tourism, for example, would provide a “big bang for the effort.” African 
states are ill-equipped to manage detailed trade liberalization and 
domestic reform across a broad front. Broad reform should be focussed in 
national markets;  
 
v If governments are serious about enhancing the public welfare they 
should be inviting foreign investors to enhance their network 
infrastructures. There seems little to negotiate with the industrial 
countries other than broad access for their products noted above. There 
seems to be little merit in the arguments that African countries negotiate 
at the level to which they are being pushed by the UNCTAD; and 
 
v Efficacious links between Geneva and national capitals must be based on 
principles of Weberian bureaucracy and not rent-seeking. 
 
The above sequencing is important. In the absence of good governance foreign 
investors will not come even if countries undertake to pursue the rule of law 
provisions of the WTO. The commitment to good governance principles must be 
complete and unequivocal. Thus the focus on governance is deliberate. Indeed, 
in recent years development research has suggested that the direction of 
causality is from good governance (democracy) to economic and social 
development and not the other way around. 
 
Finally, on the AERC proposal, it is interesting that the supervision of the 
project’s activities would be in the hands of public sector, international 
organizations and academics. The absence of private and NGO participants is 
inconsistent with the results of the CAPAS evaluation. Furthermore, a formal 
accountability and responsibility structure is necessary. The appropriate 
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framework could be an executive committee comprising the donors but 
augmented by the appropriate research directors and African experts on 
governance. The executive committee would be accountable for results to the 
donors. It is not clear what the proposed G-11 would do for the AERC project – 
but it could perform the role of a board of directors. In addition, consideration 
should be given to bringing together a group of people who can give support to 
the project in the areas where CAPAS failed to achieve its goals. 
 
b.         The SATRN Proposal 
 
The SATRN proposal to the IDRC is a clear improvement on the regime 
proposed by the AERC. Indeed, the SATRN paper picks up on the deficiencies 
identified in the CAPAS program.  Having said that, the SATRN program is very 
ambitious and still advocates negotiations on a broad front.  
 
This broad and comprehensive approach is the agenda of the UNCTAD and 
WTO, not of the African and other developing countries. It appears quite clear 
that the SADC countries (as well as the east and west African countries) cannot 
cope effectively with the developed world’s trade agenda and schedule – so the 
question is why should they try.  
 
Perhaps another track would prove more fruitful – starting with a calendar that 
is appropriate to the African agenda – if one can be developed and agreed upon. 
The SATRN proposal touches on this issue but does not firmly come down on 
the side of proposing an alternative schedule appropriate to the capacities of the 
SADC countries. Thus, we think there is a valid need for the proposal to address 
the question of an agenda that would be suitable to the states of the African 
continent generally. 
 
There is also a need to clearly link the domestic economic and social 
development requirements of each country with the trade agenda. The 
identification of this important linkage was supposed to come from the CAPAS 
program – but the results were spotty and much of the linkage that was 
identified was simply paying “lip-service” to the objectives of the program. 
There is little evidence that the research and subsequent policy supply took 
serious account of the linkages.  
 
The SATRN proposal properly highlights the need for more robust policy 
analysis. But once again it seems that the “tail is wagging the dog.” The policy 
analysis must link the domestic conjuncture to trade policy. What is proposed is 
a focus dealing with the WTO issues – which undoubtedly will be the issues of 
the developed countries.  The appropriate focus for the African states will come 
from the answer to the following question: What are the development priorities 
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for African countries and how can trade help achieve those priorities? Nothing 
less should be acceptable.  
 
Similarly, the training of officials in trade policy and trade negotiations will still 
leave the domestic and trade policy linkage in a limbo. While trade analysis is 
important, what is probably more important is policy analysis more generally. A 
vacuum in domestic policy capacity does not help much with striking the correct 
balance in trade policy. This has been clear in the Asian countries – particularly 
in Korea and Japan -- where domestic policy capacity has been much weaker 
than trade policy capacity. 
 
 
VII.        Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
From the perspective of the evaluator, the weaknesses uncovered in the CAPAS 
program are not adequately addressed by the AERC or the SATRN proposals, 
although the SATRN paper is more sympathetic to the problems that have 
appeared in CAPAS. It is useful, therefore, to complete this discussion of where 
to go now by referring to the recommendations in the first interim Report. 
 
 
The first recommendation suggested that a narrower focus of the research 
program was necessary. Having reviewed virtually all of the CAPAS papers, 
having spent some 9 days listening to discussions among country participants, 
and having talked privately to many country representatives, it is very clear that 
the sub-Saharan countries do not have the capacity to deal with WTO agenda, 
with regional integration initiatives, and with domestic reform and governance 
issues. Clearly, a much narrower focus is needed.  
 
Indeed, the new trade research agenda must be compressed so that visible social 
and economic progress can be achieved. This means that countries should pick 
winners and focus the research effort on these. The rest should be left for another 
day. (It is useful to keep in mind that many Asian countries delayed wholesale 
opening until they were ready. Those who danced to another country’s priorities 
got themselves into trouble.) Common negotiating positions may jump out of a 
narrower focus. In this respect it is useful to recall that the seed for what is now 
the EU started out as an agreement on coal and steel. 
 
The second recommendation implied that the capacity building that was in train 
during the CAPAS program might have been inappropriately targeted because 
the senior bureaucratic and political decision-makers were generally not listening 
to the researchers. That was the case through all of the phases of CAPAS. So if it 
is difficult for policy-thinkers to penetrate policy-makers, there is a need to 
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discover why and to change the situation.  So before an elaborate apparatus is 
established from the SATRN and AERC proposals it will be useful to discover 
how the distrust between policy-thinkers and –makers can be ameliorated. 
 
The third recommendation suggested narrowing the number of countries in the 
capacity building program to those where there is some reasonable likelihood 
that progress will be achieved. The proposals currently on the table, which 
divide up the sub-Saharan countries into two groups achieve this objective in 
part – as French West Africa may left out of the picture. 
 
The third recommendation also noted that the lack of participation of the private 
and para-public sectors short-circuited the establishment of policy communities. 
It is clear that this situation will persist with the AERC proposal, and it is unclear 
how the SATRN proposal will deal with nurturing a policy community. The 
establishment of national policy communities is necessary if trade and domestic 
policy are to be coherent. 
 
The fourth recommendation addressed the need for an appropriate 
accountability framework for the capacity-building program. The AERC 
proposal is far away from the ideal and the proposed framework for the SATRN 
proposal seems rather unwieldy – particularly given the numerous ways in 
which capacity building is addressed. 
 
It seems that the donors should be directly involved in reviewing progress of the 
programs. This was an important lesson from the CAPAS program. Weaknesses 
in meeting the objectives of the program – whether analytical or process – should 
be identified quickly and corrected. Had this been the case under CAPAS 
perhaps the IWGs would have been more effective and outcomes more valuable. 
 
To these four recommendations we would add the following: 
 
First, before embarking on another formal program the donors ought to review 
the results of CAPAS with some of participating countries directly. This should 
take place at a formal meeting – perhaps on neutral ground in Geneva.  The 
requirements for nurturing a policy community, for developing robust policy 
analysis for domestic and trade policy, and the need to focus on winners should 
be explored with countries. UNCTAD should not participate in this meeting. 
(The evaluators would be available to assist with such a meeting.) 
 
If a CAPAS type program is funded through the AERC, and the evaluators think 
that it should be, the aforementioned meeting should be held. And, attention 
should be directed at how the West African countries, because of the linguistic 
differences, will be a full participants in a pan-African project.  
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Despite the need for indigenous management, it is stressed again that a proper 
accountability framework should not be allowed dribble off the table by the 
donors. 
 
Second, appropriate benchmarks ought to be established by the new managers 
of the program, AERC, if that is the decision. These benchmarks should articulate 
a classification of countries according to: the robustness of the services sector; the 
indigenous capability of establishing and nurturing effective policy community 
with access to the policy-making cadre; the presence and capacity of credible 
national institutions that can conduct policy-oriented research and prescriptions 
in the services sector and in trade in services.   
 
On the basis of these indicators, the managers should develop an entry and exit 
strategy for each country into or from the program.  In other words, there should 
be a point at which the individual countries should be able and ready to continue 
with the task of assessing and reforming its national policies on services so as to 
be able to participate effectively in GATS.   
 
Third, countries ought to think about how the trade agenda should be altered to 
suit their requirements and their capacity. Marching to the WTO and UNCTAD 
beat is clearly inappropriate and unrealistic if the African countries are to 
enhance social and economic development. 
 
Fourth, some thought ought to be given to how more general issues of good 
governance could be migrated to the capacity building program. Such an 
initiative could have important policy externalities for public policy generally in 
these countries. Perhaps a parallel program on governance could be established 
and opportunities for cross-fertilization among the two initiatives could be 
provided at meetings. 
 
Fifth, future funding of meetings should eliminate the incentive for more 
meetings. Thus, participants should be given sufficient funds to cover cost of 
meals and incidentals while the cost of accommodation should be provided by 
the donors and paid directly to the establishment providing the accommodation. 
Such measures will ensure that appropriate people attend the meetings and that 
there is participation from the private sector. The private sector has been 
conspicuously absent from the three regional meetings in which we have 
participated. There is a need to deal with the rent-seeking tendencies quickly.  
 
Sixth, the donors should be present at all meetings in order to provide “real 
time” feedback to participating countries. We do not think that the presence and 
participation of donors is inconsistent with the objective of having the Africans 
manage the program. 
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Seventh, we see no need presently to “beef up” the national representation at the 
WTO until bureaucracies in the national capitals can effectively develop 
negotiating positions and provide reasonable instructions to their 
representatives. Indeed, if there could be a narrowing of the scope the Africans’ 
policy stance in services, better use could be made of the existing complement of 
Geneva representatives. 
 
Moreover, African countries have no comparative advantage in governance of 
international organizations at the present time. Thus, they should use their voice 
and scarce resources to secure an international trade agenda of a magnitude that 
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CAPAS Evaluation Methodology 
 
 
Objective of the Program 
 
To assist individual countries in both developing a body of relevant knowledge 
in the areas of services, trade, and economic development and building policy-
research and policy-making capacity in these areas both institutionally and 
individually. 
 
Phase One Objectives – Were they Achieved? 
 
v Formation of an Institutional Working Group (IWG) in each country 
v Creation of a national research team to prepare a national study on services 
by the national research group -  with support from IWG 
v Sharing of experiences and lessons learned by each of the national research 
teams and inter-institutional research teams 
v Provision of technical support through missions by the staff of the project’s 
executing agencies and the international experts associated with the program 
v A first look at regional issues as they relate to services (?) 
 
q Objectives of the National Studies (Phase I) 
 
 To develop  a profile of the aggregate contribution of services and stock-
taking of resources 
 Needs requirements 
 To develop a profile of the regulatory environment 
 To develop mini case-studies of four or five service sectors to identify 
bottlenecks on both the supply and the demand sides 
 Successes 
 Potential contributions to development 
 
Assess quality of the national studies – did they meet 
objectives? 
To review the lessons learned from Phase One 
 
Definition of services? Must be contextually driven? 
Market structure for services – robust/weak 
Regulatory capacity (e.g. financial and insurance 
services) 
Deregulation/reregulation – appropriate? 
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qObjectives of the Sectoral Studies (Phase II) 
 
q Move from descriptive to prescriptive 
q Concrete proposals for domestic policy reform, regional 
integration, negotiating positions 
q Be well placed for future GATS negotiations 
q Develop broad-based analytical capacity in the area of services not 
only within the sate but also among academics, consultants, 
businesses and parastatal entities. 
q Encourage a policy process that includes participation of and 
consultation with actors outside the state. 
q Strengthen the development of national analytical and decision-
making capacities around the national research teams and the 
institutional working groups. 
 
 Will cover trade-infrastructure services, financial services, new 
services, telecommunications, trade in skilled labor and new services. 
 Minimum goal of this phase was to ensure that each country in the 
CAPAS program would be in a position to make liberalization offers 
by the end of 1995 to the GATS.  
 
 Studies will focus on: 
Identifying policy needs in the aforementioned sectors at the 
domestic, regional and international levels. 
National sectoral studies will focus on financial 
services, trade infrastructure services (e.g., 
shipping/transportation, wholesaling/marketing, 
customs) and optimal regulation of new services. 
Regional sectoral studies will focus on 
telecommunications and trade in skilled labor 
services 
Industries selected because they were seen as critical 
strategic areas for strengthening of service capacity. 
 
 
q The research methodology should stress the development of policy 
recommendations pertinent to the needs for domestic reform, for 
speeding up and identifying regional integration objectives and for 
formulating market access offers and requests at the individual 
country level in the context of the multilateral negotiations. At the very 
minimum. Each case study should provide each government with 
recommendations that can be used to formulate market offers and 
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requests in GATS that are consistent with domestic reforms and 
regional integration objectives. 
 
q Did the international experts provide an appropriate methodology for 
the sectoral studies? Is it necessary to talk to international institutions 
(WTO/GATS, World Bank, IMF, European Commission, African 
Development Bank, and ITU)?  Are there differential outcomes for the 






v Policy Relevance of the CAPAS Program 
 
q Where does development of services producing industries fit in to the 
comprehensive development plan of participating nations?  
 
q The answer to this question, positive or negative, will set the stage for 
dealing with Questions 1a to 1b of the terms of reference. However, 
how this question is answered may hinge on the capacity questions. 
That is to say, services may be a priority because the capacity of the 
public and private sectors can deal with the policy and management 
issues (human and social capital). Services may not be a priority 
because of the lack of capacity. 
 
q Are the sectoral linkages – services output supporting goods output – 




v Capacity Building 
 
q It may be necessary to focus on two types of capacity – institutional 
capacity (from the perspective of adequacy of the infrastructure) and 
human capacity (the intellectual capital of the individuals populating the 
institutions).  
 
q Deal with questions raised in the Terms of Reference Document. 
 
v Technical Merit 
 
q Comparative analysis 
 39
 
q I think question 3c – dealing with multi-disciplinarity -- is very important. 
One of the criticisms I have of current development and structural adjustment 
practice is that it is one-dimensional. The economists paradigm seems to 
predominate whereas practitioners in the other social sciences (sociology, 
psychology geography and political science, for example) probably have a lot 




v Retrospective on Process Capacity of CAPAS 
 
v Judgements about locating the process under African management. 
 
v How will “Africanization” impinge on policy relevance, policy capacity and 
technical merit down the road? 
 
Phase Three  
 
[This is probably more appropriately dealt with in the Phase One section – 
except for the section on outputs which seems to be a stand-alone project – or 




q To examine the implications for African countries of trade issues that 
go beyond the GATS, such as the creation and functioning of the WTO 
– particularly its adjudication wing – and the transition away from 
“imperial” trade preferences towards a more WTO-based and 
European-based set of trade rules. 
q To examine the political economy of decision-making in a set of 
African countries to determine the forces at play when these countries 




q Eight new countries – compress Phases One and Two 
q Overview study of the size, importance, regulation of services in 
each industry examined 





q In addition to above? 
q Level of unilateral liberalization in individual sectors by African 
countries 
q Degree of multilateral bindings of service reforms by African 
countries under the GATS 
q Trade-off between greater or lesser multilateral bindings 
q Ways in which countries can bind a wider spectrum of their 
unilateral reforms using “scheduled limitations” to protect 
themselves. 
 
Some Personal Observations and Questions 
 
v Weakness in services seems to be related to the benchmark of more 
advanced/developed societies. Is there sufficient recognition of the need for 
institution building – including those of the market and of governance? Also, 
the perceived demands being made on the African countries participating in 
the CAPAS program are more consistent with structures of democratic 
capitalist societies? In the evaluation does attention have to be directed at 
these issues? Socialization, and the values of democracy take a long time to 
congeal – to say nothing of the institutions of a democracy (see CAPAS: A 
Prospectus, 1995). 
 
v Are there important lessons from Asia and Russia that should be heeded in 
the evaluation and recommendations for the future regarding economic 
openness? 
 




Some Methodological Issues for the Evaluation 
 
(i) Value focus – Should we evaluate the goals and objectives of the CAPAS 
program itself? 
(ii) Fact Value Interdependence – What should we use as benchmarks to 
determine the high or low level of CAPAS performance.  
 
q Quality of the documents – rated on a scale of 1 – 10 with the 
best of the group as a 10? Rated on a scale of 1 – 10 compared to 
other analysis for developing country policies? 
q Benchmarks based on the usefulness of the outputs to 
individual policy-makers, to groups in society (industry and/or 
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the firm), to society generally? Would require interviews with 
key actors in public/private/academic/institutional sectors. 
q Benchmarks by the evaluators – a good or bad outcome over 




A Matrix for Evaluation 
Criterion Question Criteria 
Effectiveness Has a useful outcome 
been achieved – capacity 
building for policy 
research and decision-
making? 
Number of Papers? 
View of respondents? 
Institutions? 
Individuals? 




Adequacy Has the perceived 
problem been resolved? 
Quality of analysis? 
Degree of networking? 
Quality of GATS offers? 
Responsiveness Have the outcomes 
satisfied policy-makers, 
industry, and civil 
society? 
Consistent with views of 
actors? 
Appropriateness Are the desired outcomes 






More Formal Outline of the Evaluation 
 
(i) Objectives of the CAPAS program 
q Rank objectives 
(ii) Review of the outputs 
(iii) Consistency between objectives and outputs 
(iv) Review of the outcomes 
q Rank outcomes 
q Outcomes Measurement (?) 
(v) Consistency between outcomes and objectives 





(i) Project Outline (5 days each evaluator)? 
(ii) Review all documents and make notes (5 – 10 days for each evaluator) 
(iii) Meetings in New York and documentation (4 days – SH) 
(iv) Written evaluation of documents (5 days each evaluator) 
(v) Attend regional meetings and document (10 days – each evaluator)?  
(vi) Interview actors in supranational organizations and document (10 days 
each evaluator)? 
(vii) Interview key actors – at regional meetings – after regional meetings 10 
days and document (?) 
(viii) Draft final report (5 days each evaluator)? 
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